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LOEWEN V. UNITED STATES: TRIALS AND ERRORS
UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER ELEVEN
William S. Dodge*
INTRODUCTION
There have been many efforts to reform the American civil justice
system, stretching back more than thirty years.' During the past dec-
ade, the United States Supreme Court has begun to play a more active
role, using the Due Process Clause to impose both substantive 2 and
procedural 3 limitations on punitive damages. The Loewen case,4 a
claim filed against the United States under Chapter 11 of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 5 raises another possibil-
ity: using international tribunals to correct errors in civil trials.
6
In 1995, a Mississippi jury ordered a Canadian funeral home com-
pany, Loewen Group International (Loewen), to pay $100 million in
compensatory damages and $400 million in punitive damages on
claims that included fraud and violations of Mississippi antitrust law.
Rather than post the $625 million bond necessary to stay execution of
the judgment pending appeal, Loewen settled the suit for $175 mil-
lion. Loewen then filed a claim against the United States under Chap-
ter 11 of NAFTA alleging that its trial was infected with bias
concerning nationality, racial attitudes, and economic class; that the
$500 million verdict was grossly excessive; and that the bond require-
ment denied it the chance to appeal. As of this writing, Loewen's
claim has been submitted to the arbitral tribunal, and a final award is
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Thanks to Chip
Brower, Jack Coe. Richard Epstein. and Richard Lempert for comments on an earlier draft.
1. See Note. "Common Sense" Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform. 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1765 (1996).
2. BMW of N. Am.. Inc. v. Gore. 517 U.S. 559 (1996): TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res.
Corp.. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
3. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.. 532 U.S. 424 (2001): Honda Motor Co.
v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
4. The Loewen Group. Inc. v. United States. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (Nov. 19. 1998).
5. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 7-17. 1992. ch. 11. 32 I.L.M. 605. 639-49
[hereinafter NAFTA].
6. There is currently one other Chapter II claim based on a court decision pending against the
United States. See Notice of Arbitration Claim. Mondev Int'l. Ltd. v. United States. ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/99/2 (Sept. 1, 1999). available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
3931.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
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expected soon. Although Loewen disclaimed any intent to use Chap-
ter 11 as an alternative form of appeal, Loewen sought, as one would
on appeal, to correct errors allegedly made at trial.7
This Article will argue that review by international tribunals is not a
good way to correct trial errors, and Chapter 11 should be changed to
require, or at least to encourage, the exhaustion of domestic appeals
before resorting to NAFTA arbitration. Part II briefly reviews the
Loewen trial and the errors that allegedly occurred. Part III identifies
Chapter l's weaknesses as a system of appeal. Part IV then consid-
ers two alternatives. The first is to require the exhaustion of domestic
appeals by enforcing what is known in international law as the "local
remedies rule."'8 The second is to allow immediate resort to Chapter
11 but to encourage the exhaustion of domestic appeals first by mak-
ing Chapter 11 enforceable in domestic courts, expressly tolling the
statute of limitations for filing NAFTA claims while domestic appeals
are exhausted and removing the possibility that domestic court deci-
sions would have a res judicata effect in a subsequent Chapter 11 pro-
ceeding. Part V briefly considers whether these alternatives might
apply not just to trial errors, but also to more typical violations of
Chapter 11, such as expropriations. Part VI concludes.
II. TRIAL AND ERRORS
Loewen began with a small, yet somewhat complicated, business
dispute.9 In April 1991, Jeremiah O'Keefe, a funeral home owner
from Biloxi, Mississippi, sued Loewen Group International, Inc., al-
leging interference with O'Keefe's business relations with another
Mississippi funeral home. Loewen Group International was an Amer-
7. Compare Memorial of The Loewen Group. Inc. 1 (Oct. 18, 1999) (unpublished memorial.
on file with author) [hereinafter Loewen Memorial] (stating that "[t]his claim does not seek
direct or collateral review of the municipal-law issues addressed by the Mississippi courts in the
O'Keefe litigation"), and Opinion of Sir Robert Jennings at 2 (Oct. 26, 1998), reprinted in
Loewen Memorial, supra. at Exhibit A (opining that Loewen's claim "would not be a claim
forming in any way an appeal from the verdicts and judgment of the Mississippi Hinds County
Court, but a new and different claim ... for ... breaches of the NAFTA Treaty"), with Rejoinder
of the United States of America at 2 (Aug. 27, 2001) (unpublished memorial, on file with author)
(stating that "this international claim is little more than a substitute for the appeal from the trial
court's judgment that Loewen elected to forgo in the Mississippi courts").
It is perhaps ironic that all three members of the Loewen tribunal have served as appellate
judges: Sir Anthony Mason was Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia: Abner Mikva was
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: and Sir
Michael Mustill was Lord Justice of the English Court of Appeals.
8. See generally C.F. AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990).
9. Unless otherwise indicated, the facts are taken from the Loewen Memorial. See Loewen
Memorial, supra note 7, at 8-61. For a more colorful account of the trial and the characters
involved, see Jonathan Harr, The Burial. NEw YORKER. Nov. 1. 1999. at 70.
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ican subsidiary of The Loewen Group, Inc., a Canadian company con-
trolled and partially owned by Raymond Loewen, a Canadian citizen.
In August 1991, the parties tentatively agreed to settle the suit:
Loewen would have purchased two funeral homes from O'Keefe, and
O'Keefe would have bought an insurance company from Loewen.
The proposed settlement was never finalized, however, and in 1992
O'Keefe amended his complaint to add claims of fraud and violations
of Mississippi antitrust law. The suit went to trial in state court in 1995
against Loewen Group International, its Canadian parent, and a local
Mississippi funeral chain that Loewen owned. After a seven-week
trial, the jury found for the plaintiff and awarded $100 million in com-
pensatory damages (a large portion of which was for emotional dis-
tress) and $400 million in punitive damages, for a total award of $500
million. In Mississippi, a losing defendant who wished to stay execu-
tion of the judgment pending appeal had to post a bond for 125% of
the judgment, although the bond could be reduced for "good cause."
In January 1996, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied Loewen's ap-
plication to reduce the bond, and five days later, Loewen settled the
suit for $175 million. Financial difficulties that began around the time
of the verdict ultimately forced Loewen into bankruptcy in June 1999.
The Chapter 11 violations alleged by Loewen fall into three basic
categories. First, Loewen alleged that "[t]he trial court allowed
O'Keefe's counsel to make irrelevant and highly prejudicial com-
ments, and to elicit from witnesses irrelevant and highly prejudicial
testimony, about the nationality, racial attitudes, and economic class
of the parties in this case."' 0 Loewen complained that plaintiff's coun-
sel attempted to whip up anti-Canadian sentiment on the jury by con-
trasting Loewen's Canadian origins with O'Keefe's Mississippi roots,
implied that Raymond Loewen was a racist by calling a series of wit-
nesses to testify that O'Keefe was not one, and emphasized Mr.
Loewen's wealth. 1' It is unlikely that Loewen could have relied on
these alleged errors to challenge the verdict on appeal because
Loewen's counsel failed to object to nearly all of them at trial.' 2
Loewen argued. however, that NAFTA Article 1105(1)'s guarantee of
"full protection and security" imposed an "affirmative duty"'13 on the
trial court "to restrain the hundreds of invidious appeals by plaintiff's
counsel to national pride, to disparities in wealth, and even to racial
10. Loewen Memorial. supra note 7. at 62.
11. Id. at 8-47.
12. Statement of Stephan Landsman, Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, 18-
36. Tab C (Mar. 30. 2001) (unpublished memorial, on file with author).
13. Loewen Memorial. supra note 7. at 91. 93 & 95.
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prejudice."1 4  According to Loewen, such prejudicial comments by
plaintiff's counsel constituted "procedural denial[s] of justice"'1 in vi-
olation of international law and therefore in violation of NAFTA Ar-
ticle 1105,16 as well as Article 1102's requirement of "national
treatment." 17
Second, Loewen alleged that the $500 million verdict itself was a
substantive denial of justice in violation of Article 110518 and an ex-
propriation of property in violation of Article 1110.19 Loewen argued
that the punitive damages award of $400 million in particular would
have been overturned on appeal under either state or federal
standards. 20
Third, Loewen alleged that the $625 million bond requirement con-
stituted a "procedural denial of justice" in violation of Article 1105.21
Although the question of whether the Due Process Clause requires
reduction of an excessive bond is one the United States Supreme
Court left unanswered in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. ,22 Loewen chose
not to seek Supreme Court review of the bond requirement.
Each of the three kinds of errors of which Loewen complained
could have been addressed by U.S. domestic courts on appeal: the al-
legedly prejudicial comments of plaintiff's counsel if Loewen had ob-
jected to them at trial; the $500 million judgment itself as a violation
of state and federal standards governing punitive damages; and the
$625 million bond requirement as a violation of the Due Process
14. Id. at 96.
15. Id. at 90.
16. See NAFTA, supra note 5. at art. 1105(1) (requiring that "[e]ach Party shall accord to
investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, includ-
ing fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security").
17. Loewen Memorial. supra note 7, at 71-72. See also NAFTA, supra note 5. at art. 1102(1)
(stating that "[e]ach Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable
than that it accords in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment,
acquisition, expansion. management, conduct, operation. and sale or other disposition of
investments").
18. Loewen Memorial. supra note 7, at 75-88.
19. Id. at 99-104. See also NAFTA. supra note 5. at art. 1110(1), which states:
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an in-
vestor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization
or expropriation of such an investment ('expropriation'). except: (a) for a public pur-
pose: (b) on a non-discriminatory basis: (c) in accordance with due process of law and
Article 1105(1): and (d) on payment of compensation ....
Id.
20. Loewen Memorial, sipra note 7. at 87.
21. Id. at 89, 90.
22. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
[Vol. 52:563566
2002] TRIALS & ERRORS UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER 11 567
Clause. 23 Loewen was not required to exhaust its domestic appeals,
however, because Chapter 11 waives the "local remedies rule" and
gives foreign investors harmed by the errors of a trial court the option
of immediate review by an international tribunal.
III. NAFTA CHAPTER ELEVEN AS A SYSTEM OF APPEAL
As a general matter, customary international law requires that a
foreign investor exhaust its domestic remedies before pursuing an in-
ternational claim.24 This "local remedies rule" may, however, be
waived by treaty,25 and NAFTA Article 1121 appears to do just that.
Article 1121 requires, as condition precedent to arbitration, that the
foreign investor waive its right "to initiate or continue before any ad-
ministrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party, or other dis-
pute settlement procedures, any proceedings with respect to the
measure of the disputing Party that is alleged to be a breach. ' 26 In
other words, Chapter 11 requires a foreign investor to waive its do-
mestic remedies rather than to exhaust them. 27 Because court judg-
ments are "measures" covered by Chapter 11,28 Loewen was entitled
to file a Chapter 11 claim based on the judgment so long as it waived
its right to appeal that judgment through the domestic court system.
Although Loewen was entitled to file a Chapter 11 claim immedi-
ately, it was not required to do so. The language of Article 1121 sug-
gests that an investor may challenge a court judgment or other
"measure" in domestic court.29 It must simply waive the right to "con-
23. In each case, Loewen's appeal would have been limited to issues of domestic law because.
as I explain in more detail below. U.S. legislation implementing NAFTA does not permit viola-
tions of NAFTA to be raised in U.S. courts. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
24. See Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 5, 27 (Mar. 21) (stating that "[t]he rule
that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a
well-established rule of customary international law").
25. See Case Concerning Flettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 42
(July 20) (expressing "no doubt that the parties to a treaty can therein either agree that the local
remedies rule shall not apply to claims based on alleged breaches of that treaty: or confirm that
it shall apply"). See generally AMERASINGHE. supra note 8, at 251-75.
26. NAFTA, supra note 5. at arts. 1121(1)(b), (2)(b). There is an exception for "proceedings
for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief, not involving the payment of damages,"
which a foreign investor is permitted to initiate or continue even after submitting a Chapter 11
claim to arbitration. Id.
27. For a more extensive discussion, see William S. Dodge. National Courts and International
Arbitration: Exhaustion of Remedies and Res ludicata Under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA. 23
HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 357, 373-76 (2000).
28. The Loewen Group. Inc. v. United States. Decision on Hearing of Respondent's Objec-
tion to Competence and Jurisdiction 9-16 (Jan. 5. 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/392 1.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
29. NAFTA. supra note 5. at arts. 1121(1)(b). (2)(b).
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tinue" those proceedings once it files a NAFTA claim.30 Chapter 11
contains a statute of limitations provision requiring a foreign investor
to file its claim within three years of the alleged breach and loss. 3' But
this means Loewen had the option of pursuing appeals in the United
States court system for up to three years without foregoing its right to
seek redress under NAFTA.
There are several aspects of Chapter 11, however, that will tend to
discourage a foreign investor from exhausting its domestic appeals.
First, Chapter 11 does not expressly toll its three-year statute of limi-
tations while those appeals are exhausted. 2 A foreign investor might
therefore expend substantial time and resources pursuing its domestic
appeals, only to be forced to abandon either those appeals or its po-
tential Chapter 11 claim if the appellate process takes more than three
years.
Second, a foreign investor will generally not be able to raise its
Chapter 11 claims in domestic court. Both the United States and Ca-
nada have passed legislation that precludes private parties from rais-
ing NAFTA claims in their courts.3 3 Mexico discourages foreign in-
vestors from raising Chapter 11 claims in its courts by barring an in-
30. Id.
31. See id. at art. 1116(2) (stating that "[a]n investor may not make a claim if more than three
years have elapsed from the date on which the investor first acquired, or should have first ac-
quired. knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the investor has incurred loss or
damage"): id. at art. 1117(2) (stating that "[a]n investor may not make a claim on behalf of an
enterprise ... if more than three years have elapsed from the date on which the enterprise first
acquired. or should have first acquired. knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the
enterprise has incurred loss or damage").
32. One might argue that Chapter 11 implicitly tolls its statute of limitations while an investor
exhausts domestic remedies. The three-year period set forth in Articles 1116(2) and 1117(2)
does not begin running until the investor or enterprise acquired. or should have acquired.
"knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the investor [or enterprise! has incurred
loss or damage." Id. at arts. 1116(2). 1117(2) (emphasis added). Arguably, an investor or enter-
prise would not be certain it has incurred loss or damage until its domestic remedies proved
unsuccessful. One might further argue, in the case of court decisions, that there can be no
breach of Chapter 11 until domestic appeals have been exhausted and that only then would the
three-year statute of limitations begin to run. Neither argument is certain to prevail, however, so
the lack of an express provision for tolling is still likely to discourage domestic appeals.
33. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 3312(c)(2), which states:
No person other than the United States ... may challenge. in any action brought under
any provision of law. any action or inaction by any department. agency. or other instru-
mentality of the United States, any State. or any political subdivision of a State on the
ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent with the [NAFFA] ....
Id.
See also North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act. ch. 44, 1993 S.C. 1924-25
(Can.). which states:
Subject to Section B of Chapter Eleven of the Agreement. no person has any cause of
action and no proceedings of any kind shall be taken, without the consent of the Attor-
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vestor who does so from submitting those claims to a subsequent
arbitral tribunal.3 4 This means an investor must find a domestic law
proxy for its Chapter 11 claim. Loewen, for example, could not have
argued on appeal that the $500 million judgment against it was a "de-
nial of justice" in violation of customary international law and there-
fore in violation of NAFTA Article 1105. It would have been limited
to arguing that this judgment violated Mississippi law or the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the protections
of domestic law are generally better developed than their Chapter 11
counterparts,39 this may either encourage or discourage a foreign in-
vestor from appealing domestically, depending on the strength of its
legal case.
Third, a foreign investor who pursues domestic appeals runs the risk
that a decision on appeal will be used against it in a subsequent Chap-
ter 11 proceeding. The merits of a Chapter 11 claim itself will gener-
ally not be at issue in a domestic appeal because the investor is
precluded from raising such claims, 36 but the domestic courts may
make findings that bear upon the investor's Chapter 11 claim. In
Azinian v. Mexico, for example, the NAFTA tribunal arguably treated
the Mexican court's conclusion that a concession agreement had been
induced by fraud as res judicata.37 A foreign investor may be unwill-
ing to risk prejudicing its Chapter 11 claim by seeking redress in do-
mestic court.
In Loewen's case, two additional factors likely contributed to its de-
cision to seek review through Chapter 11. First, it would have been
expensive for Loewen to post the $625 million bond necessary to stay
execution of the judgment pending appeal, and Loewen likely judged
that its chances of getting the United States Supreme Court to take its
case on the due process issue were slim. Second, Chapter 11 offered
the possibility of not just recouping the money that Loewen was obli-
gated to pay the plaintiff, but also recovering consequential damages
for harm the verdict had allegedly done to its business.
ney General of Canada. to enforce or determine any right or obligation that is claimed
or arises solely under or by virtue of the Agreement.
Id.
34. See NAFTA, supra note 5. at Annex 1120.1.
35. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
36. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
37. Azinian v. United Mexican States (Nov. 1. 1999), 39 I.L.M. 537. 551 (2000) (stating that
"[a] governmental authority surely cannot be faulted for acting in a manner validated by its
courts unless the courts themselves are disavowed at the international level") (emphasis omit-
ted). For further discussion of Azinian, see Dodge. supra note 27. at 376-79.
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Within the context of a treaty for the protection of foreign invest-
ment, allowing immediate review of court judgments under Chapter
11 has advantages and disadvantages. The principal advantage is that
it allows foreign investors to avoid the possibly "biased, inefficient or
unfamiliar courts of their host states."' 38 This advantage is particularly
significant in treaties with less developed countries, and it is important
to remember that it was in the context of such treaties that the prac-
tice of waiving the local remedies rule and allowing immediate re-
course to international arbitration evolved. 39 When the investment
treaty is between more developed countries like the United States and
Canada, however, a number of disadvantages emerge more clearly.
Compared to domestic courts, Chapter 11 review tends to be less de-
terminate, less accountable, less legitimate, and more intrusive on na-
tional sovereignty.
Chapter 11 review tends to be less determinate because the applica-
ble law is less developed. One of Loewen's main claims, for example,
was that the $500 million judgment, which included $400 million in
punitive damages, was a "denial of justice" in violation of customary
international law. There are relatively few international decisions de-
fining the scope of a "denial of justice" claim and apparently none
that have dealt with this claim in the context of punitive damages.40
United States domestic law on punitive damages is better defined. By
statute, Mississippi requires that a jury awarding punitive damages
find "by clear and convincing evidence" that the defendant "acted
with actual malice, gross negligence .. .or committed actual fraud"
and requires the jury and the trial judge to consider the potential
harmfulness of defendant's conduct, the reprehensibility of defen-
dant's conduct, and the defendant's financial condition.4' The United
States Supreme Court has further held that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits "grossly excessive" awards 42
and requires consideration of the reprehensibility of defendant's con-
duct, the potential harm it might have caused, and the sanctions appli-
cable to comparable misconduct.43 Although United States domestic
38. Charles H. Brower. I, Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 61, on file with author).
39. For a brief discussion of bilateral investment treaties and the local remedies rule, see
Dodge. supra note 27. at 363-64.
40. The parties' memorials cite none that deal with punitive damages.
41. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65 (2001). The common law of Mississippi requires an evaluation
of similar factors. See Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So. 2d 1172, 1190-91 (Miss.
1990).
42. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp.. 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993).
43. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore. 517 U.S. 559. 575-85 (1996).
[Vol. 52:563
2002] TRIALS & ERRORS UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER 11 571
standards for punitive damages leave a good deal of discretion to the
reviewing court, they offer significantly more guidance and place
greater limits on the exercise of discretion than customary interna-
tional law currently does.
Chapter 11 review also tends to be less accountable because Chap-
ter 11 tribunals are themselves more insulated from review. Whether
a Mississippi punitive damages award is excessive is determined in the
first instance by the trial judge and ultimately by the Mississippi Su-
preme Court. 44 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
Due Process Clause requires appellate review of punitive damages
awards 45 and that such review must be de novo.46 The decisions of the
Mississippi Supreme Court are in turn reviewable by the U.S. Su-
preme Court to ensure compliance with the substantive requirements
of the Due Process Clause discussed above.47 Although review by the
U.S. Supreme Court itself is rare, the possibility of such review exerts
a restraining influence on state courts. Review of NAFfA Chapter 11
decisions is far more limited. A court reviewing a Chapter 11 award
may not set it aside if the tribunal misinterpreted the law or misap-
plied it to the facts but only if the tribunal was improperly constituted
or decided matters beyond the scope of the arbitration. 48 This more
limited review of Chapter 11 tribunals increases the chances that re-
view by such tribunals will result in errors.
Lack of determinacy and accountability in turn raise problems of
legitimacy.49 As Professor Franck has pointed out, the legitimacy of a
rule depends in part on its determinacy. 50 Decisions rendered under
new and uncertain standards are more apt to be seen as lawless than
those that draw on a more developed jurisprudence. So are decisions
rendered by unaccountable decision makers. 5'
44. See Dixie Ins. Co. v. Mooneyhan. 684 So. 2d 574 (Miss. 1996).
45. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg. 512 U.S. 415. 432 (1994).
46. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group. Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435-36 (2001).
47. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
48. See William S. Dodge. International Decision: Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 95 Ai. J. INT'L
L. 910. 918-19 (2001).
49. For an excellent discussion of legitimacy and Chapter 11, see Brower, supra note 38.
50. See THOMAS M. FRANCK. FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 30-34
(1995): THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 50-66 (1990): see
also Brower. supra note 38 (manuscript at 16-18) (discussing predictability as a factor in estab-
lishing legitimacy).
51. See Brower, supra note 38 (manuscript at 22) (stating that "[t]he use of accountable and
transparent institutions to formulate and interpret rules will increase voluntary compliance
with-and, thus, the legitimacy of-international legal regimes"): Paul B. Stephan, The New
International Law-Legirnacy, AccountabiliY,
, 
Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Or-
der. 70 U. Cot o. L. REV. 1555, 1578 (1999) (stating that "[d]iminished accountability affects the
content of rules and puts their legitimacy into question").
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Finally, immediate Chapter 11 review results in greater intrusions
on sovereignty because it does not give domestic court systems a
chance to correct their own errors. The "principal premise" of the
local remedies rule is "that the host or respondent State must be given
the opportunity of redressing the alleged injury. ' 52 The rule is "a re-
flection of the respect accorded the sovereignty of the host or respon-
dent State."' 53 Moreover, as a practical matter, the only way in which
the United States can correct the errors of local trial courts is through
appeals, ultimately to the federal court system.54 Allowing immediate
Chapter 11 review of trial errors denies the domestic legal system the
opportunity to correct its own mistakes.
In sum, by waiving the local remedies rule, NAFTA Chapter 11 al-
lows foreign investors the option to seek review of trial court errors by
an international tribunal rather than by domestic courts. Other as-
pects of Chapter 11 create incentives for foreign investors to bypass
the domestic appeals process-specifically, the absence of an express
tolling provision for Chapter Il's three-year statute of limitations, the
fact that Chapter 11 claims themselves cannot be raised in domestic
court, and the possibility that a subsequent NAFTA tribunal might
treat a domestic decision as res judicata. The system NAFTA Chapter
11 creates is unfortunate. It denies domestic courts the opportunity to
correct their own mistakes. It also results in decisions that are less
determinate, less accountable, and therefore less legitimate than do-
mestic court review.
IV. Two ALTERNATIVES
If the system for reviewing trial court decisions that NAFTA Chap-
ter 11 creates is less than ideal, what are the alternatives? Chapter 11
could be amended to require the exhaustion of domestic appeals
before filing a Chapter 11 claim. Alternatively, Chapter 11 could be
changed to encourage the exhaustion of domestic appeals, although
still permitting a foreign investor to seek immediate review by a
NAFTA tribunal at its option.
52. AMERASINGHE. supra note 8. at 97.
53. Id. at 98.
54. NAFTA tribunals have correctly held that each NAFTA government is responsible for the
actions of its state and local officials. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico (Aug. 30. 2000). 40
I.L.M. 36, 47 (2001). Unfortunately, making Chapter II enforceable in U.S. courts would not
make a defendant's Chapter 11 claims removable to federal court. See Rivet v. Regions Bank.
522 U.S. 470. 475 (1998) (holding that treaty issues that arise only in defense do not qualify for
federal question removal). Congress might wish to consider amending this rule.
[Vol. 52:563
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A. Requiring Exhaustion of Domestic Appeals
Requiring a foreign investor to exhaust its domestic appeals before
filing a Chapter 11 claim based on a court judgment would allow the
domestic court system to correct its own mistakes. It is safe to predict
that in most instances the domestic court systems of the United States
and Canada would correct their mistakes because a court judgment
that violates Chapter 11 is also likely to violate some provision of do-
mestic law such as, in Loewen's case, the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution. This means that few Chapter 11 claims
based on court judgments would need to be filed. The number of such
claims, and the resulting intrusions on national sovereignty, could be
reduced further if the substantive provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11
were themselves made enforceable in domestic court. Although these
provisions tend to have counterparts in the domestic laws of the
NAFTA parties, the contours of domestic and Chapter 11 protections
will not always be identical. In sum, with an exhaustion requirement,
foreign investors would still be able to have trial errors corrected, and
if the appeals process failed, would still be able to file a Chapter 11
claim. Most trial errors, however, would be corrected in domestic
courts, through a process that is more determinate, more accountable,
more legitimate, and less intrusive upon sovereignty than Chapter 11
review. 55
To implement an exhaustion requirement, Chapter 11 would have
to be amended in several ways. Most obviously, Article 1121 would
have to be rewritten so that it is not the waiver of domestic appeals
that is a condition precedent to filing a Chapter 11 claim on the basis
of a court judgment, 56 but rather the exhaustion of those appeals. Sec-
ond, the statutes of limitations in Articles 1116 and 111757 would need
to be amended to provide expressly for tolling during the appeals pro-
cess. It would be unfair to preclude a Chapter 11 claim as untimely
when the reason for the untimeliness would be an exhaustion require-
ment imposed by Chapter 11 itself. Finally, it would have to be made
clear that the decisions of domestic courts on appeal would in no way
bind a subsequent Chapter 11 tribunal. This would be particularly im-
portant if Chapter 11 were made directly enforceable in domestic
courts as recommended above,58 since those courts might then be rul-
ing on the merits of an investor's Chapter 11 claims. As I noted in an
earlier essay, "[i]f a claimant were required to exhaust local remedies
55. See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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and the decision of the local courts were then binding on a subsequent
international tribunal, the claimant would be denied meaningful ac-
cess to an international forum. '59
The chief drawback of requiring exhaustion, of course, is that for-
eign investors would have to proceed through a domestic court system
that might be at best inefficient and at worst biased. Within the con-
text of Chapter 11, this seems to be of greatest concern with respect to
Mexico. Such concerns would increase were Chapter 11 to be ex-
tended to cover other less developed countries as part of the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 60 In theory, it might be possible
to use the futility exception to the local remedies rule to distinguish
between those court systems whose appeals an investor should have to
exhaust and those whose appeals an investor should not have to ex-
haust. Under customary international law, foreign investors have not
been required to exhaust local remedies if they can show that this
would be "obviously futile. ' 61 In practice, however, it is no small mat-
ter to say that the courts of a country are so unable to do justice that
resorting to them would be futile, and one would expect an exhaustion
requirement to be waived only rarely on grounds of futility.62 Thus, as
a practical matter, the benefits of requiring domestic appeals to be
exhausted would likely come at the cost of subjecting at least some
foreign investors to systems of appeals that will not correct the errors
at their trials.
B. Encouraging Exhaustion of Domestic Appeals
A second alternative would be to allow investors to seek immediate
Chapter 11 review of trial court judgments but encourage them to ex-
haust their domestic appeals first. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere
that Chapter 11 was specifically designed to encourage the exhaustion
of local remedies. 63 Currently, however, it does this imperfectly be-
cause of the disincentives discussed above.64 To provide greater en-
couragement, Chapter 11 should be amended to toll expressly the
59. Dodge, supra note 27, at 370.
60. See Brower, supra note 38 (manuscript at 60).
61. AMERASINGHE, supra note 8, at 193-94.
62. In an analogous context, U.S. courts considering questions of forum non conveniens have
rarely been willing to hold that foreign courts did not provide an adequate alternative forum.
Compare Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp.. 965 F. Supp. 899. 903 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (finding that
Peruvian courts were an adequate alternative forum). and Banco Mercantil. S.A. v. Hernandez
Arencibia, 927 F. Supp. 565, 567 (D.P.R. 1996) (finding that Dominican Republic courts were an
adequate alternative forum), with Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin. 978 F. Supp. 1078. 1085-87
(S.D. Fla. 1997) (finding that Bolivian courts were not an adequate alternative forum).
63. See Dodge, supra note 27. at 381-82.
64. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
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statute of limitations while appeals are exhausted to allow Chapter 11
claims to be raised in domestic courts and to make clear that domestic
decisions do not bind Chapter 11 tribunals as res judicata.65
While the first alternative-requiring exhaustion of domestic ap-
peals-would place the task of distinguishing good and bad court sys-
tems on arbitrators,66 the second alternative would leave this task to
the market. Those countries whose systems of appeals promised to
correct trial errors would have their appeals exhausted, while those
countries whose systems of appeals were perceived as inefficient or
corrupt would find their appellate courts being bypassed. This "mar-
ket" might even exert some pressure on governments to improve their
court systems in order to encourage appeals and discourage Chapter
11 claims.
It is not clear, however, that expressly tolling the statute of limita-
tions, making Chapter 11 enforceable in domestic courts, and elimi-
nating the risk of res judicata will be sufficient to encourage most
foreign investors to seek review of trial errors in domestic courts first.
Moreover, because Chapter 11 review is less determinate and less ac-
countable than domestic court review,6 7 it is likely to be most attrac-
tive to those foreign investors with the weakest claims. An investor
that doubts its chances of success in a domestic appeal may neverthe-
less be willing to gamble on getting a sympathetic Chapter 11 tribunal
whose decision will be largely insulated from review. It may, there-
fore, be necessary to not simply encourage but to require the exhaus-
tion of domestic appeals to achieve the benefits of having domestic
court systems correct their own mistakes.
V. EXHAUSTION AND OTHER CHAPTER 11 CLAIMS
So far, we have considered only the correction of trial court errors
and whether foreign investors should be encouraged or required to
exhaust the domestic appeals process before bringing a Chapter 11
claim based on such errors. But it is not just trial courts that may
violate NAFTA. More common are claims that laws or regulatory de-
cisions violate Chapter 1 I's national treatment or expropriation provi-
sions. Should Chapter 11 be amended to encourage or require the
exhaustion of domestic remedies with respect to these sorts of claims
as well?
Although a full examination of this question is beyond the scope of
this Article, there seems little reason to distinguish court judgments
65. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
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from other measures with respect to exhaustion. A foreign investor
who feels that a regulation in the United States has expropriated its
investment in violation of NAFTA Article 1110, for example, could
file suit in state or federal court under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The guidance of the Supreme Court's takings jurispru-
dence may not be "too specific" '68 on the question of when a regula-
tion "goes too far"'69 and becomes a taking, but it is more determinate
than customary international law. The Supreme Court has held, for
example, that a court must consider "[t]he economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions" as well as "the character of the governmental action. ' 70 It has
further held that a regulation that "denies all economically beneficial
or productive use of land" requires compensation under the Takings
Clause. 71
By contrast, there is "relatively little international case law dealing
directly with regulatory takings,"72 and NAFTA tribunals faced with
the task of defining expropriation have articulated conflicting stan-
dards. In Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico,73 the Chapter 11 tribunal stated:
[E]xpropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate
and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or
formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, but
also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which
has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part,
of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of prop-
erty even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host
State.74
The S.D. Myers v. Canada tribunal, in contrast, said: "In general, the
term 'expropriation' carries with it the connotation of a 'taking' by a
governmental-type authority of a person's 'property' with a view to
transferring ownership of that property to another person .. . .The
general body of precedent usually does not treat regulatory action as
amounting to expropriation. ' 75 These sparse and conflicting decisions
68. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (characterizing takings cases as pro-
viding "some, but not too specific, guidance to courts confronted with deciding whether a partic-
ular government action goes too far and effects a regulatory taking").
69. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393. 415 (1922).
70. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City. 438 U.S. 104. 124 (1978).
71. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003. 1015 (1992).
72. David A. Gantz. Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and Environmental Regula-
tion Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'i L. REV. 651. 722 (2001).
73. 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001).
74. Id. at 50.
75. S.D. Myers. Inc. v. Canada (Nov. 13. 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1440 (2001).
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make Chapter 11's protection against regulatory expropriation less
determinate than United States law on regulatory takings.
Chapter 11 tribunals deciding regulatory expropriation cases are
also less accountable than domestic courts. In the Metalclad case, for
example, Mexico asked the Supreme Court of British Columbia, the
place of the arbitration, to set aside the award. Although the British
Columbian court noted that the Chapter 11 tribunal "gave an ex-
tremely broad definition of expropriation," it also acknowledged that
"the definition of expropriation is a question of law with which this
Court is not entitled to interfere." 76 Of course this lack of accounta-
bility, coupled with the Chapter 11 lack of determinacy, raises
problems of legitimacy.77
Finally, encouraging or requiring a foreign investor to exhaust its
domestic remedies with respect to expropriation claims would give the
domestic legal system a chance to correct its own mistakes and would
thus intrude less on sovereignty. 78 To encourage such exhaustion,
Chapter 11 claims should be made enforceable in domestic courts, the
statute of limitations should be expressly tolled while domestic reme-
dies are exhausted, and domestic court decisions should not bind
Chapter 11 tribunals as resjudicata.79 To require such exhaustion, Ar-
ticle 1121 should additionally be amended to make exhaustion of do-
mestic remedies, rather than their waiver, a condition precedent to
bringing a Chapter 11 claim. 80
VI. CONCLUSION
Trial courts make mistakes; so do other government officials. Such
mistakes should be corrected, and national practices should be held to
international standards. The system that NAFTA Chapter 11 creates
for doing this, however, is less than ideal. It allows foreign investors
to skip appeals through the domestic court system that might remedy
their complaints and take their chances with a less determinate, less
accountable, and less legitimate international tribunal. A better sys-
tem would be to put domestic courts on the front line in enforcing
Chapter 11, and to make Chapter 11 tribunals the appeal of last
resort.
76. Mexico v. Metalclad Corp.. 2001 B.C.S.C. 664. at 9 99 (B.C. Sup. Ct.. May 2. 2001). availa-
ble at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca (last visited Oct. 9. 2002). For a fuller discussion of the Metal-
clad award and the British Columbia judgment, see Dodge. supra note 48.
77. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
79. See supra text accompanying note 65.
80. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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